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Abstract
As geopolitical tensions in Europe began to devolve into World War I, international investors
began selling stocks and securities on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), converting the
proceeds into gold. A massive outflow of gold from the United States would have likely
sparked a banking panic. To avert this, the Treasury secretary pushed for the closure of the
NYSE and authorized banks to issue emergency currency at the start of August 1914 under
powers granted by the Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908. This move allowed national banks to
issue additional bank notes against privately issued assets such as commercial paper,
warehouse receipts, and securities in general. This emergency currency could be used to
satisfy depositor withdrawal requests, although it could not be counted as legal reserves.
Participating banks issued about $386 million in emergency currency, less than one-quarter
of the maximum available to them. Contemporary evaluations praised the issuance of
emergency currency as a necessity that calmed money markets and showed the utility of a
government-backed response to financial crises. However, early leaders of the Federal
Reserve System claimed that the real end of the panic came from the eventual opening of the
Federal Reserve later in 1914.
Keywords: Aldrich-Vreeland Act, emergency currency, New York Clearing House
Association, NYCH, World War I

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering broad-based emergency lending programs. Cases are available from the Journal of
Financial Crises at
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
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Board of Governors or the Federal Reserve System.
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Overview
After the Panic of 1907, Congress decided
that the United States would benefit from a
central bank that could serve as a “reserve of
lending power,” rather than relying on
private lender-of-last-resort operations
conducted by clearinghouse associations
(Sprague 1910, 319). Congress would
eventually create the Federal Reserve System
in 1913 (not operational until late 1914). The
Aldrich-Vreeland Act in 1908 was a stopgap
measure to handle crises in the interim
period. The Aldrich-Vreeland Act granted the
US Treasury Department the authority to
allow national banks to form national
currency associations that had the power to
issue emergency currency backed by
securities other than US government bonds.
National banks could also approach the
Treasury Department individually for
emergency currency backed by state and
local government bonds (this was barely
utilized in 1914). They could use this
emergency currency to satisfy depositor
withdrawals and other obligations but not as
reserves (Jacobson and Tallman 2015; Silber
2008, 76).
As geopolitical tensions in Europe grew into
the First World War during the summer of
1914, European stock exchanges shuttered
and European investors began selling their
US stocks, exchanging the proceeds for gold
(Sablik 2013; Silber 2008, 21–22). Massive
gold outflows from the United States would
have sparked widespread panic about the
potential suspension of convertibility, which
could then have led to bank runs. During the
week leading up to August 1, the reserves of
member banks in the New York Clearing
House (NYCH) declined $44 million (OCC
1914). In response, Treasury Secretary
William McAdoo announced on July 31, 1914,
that the Treasury Department would
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issue additional currency backed by securities other
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authorize the issuance of up to $500 million in emergency currency, depending on requests
(WSJ 1914).
In many ways, the Aldrich-Vreeland Act based the structure of the national currency
associations it authorized on the existing clearinghouse model, in which private financial
institutions formed a single corporate body for the purposes of alleviating financial panic.
The Aldrich-Vreeland Act allowed groups of at least 10 national banks to form national
currency associations, which would be the issuers of emergency currency. National banks
could join only one national currency association, of which there could be only one in each
city (Aldrich-Vreeland Act 1908, vol. 35, sec. 1). These associations were supposed to be
formed prior to crises so that they could immediately act during a panic. In September 1914,
there were 45 national currency associations, covering all but two states and representing
more than 2,000 national banks (or 29% of the total national banks at the time) (Dodge
1922). The associations managed collateral and issued emergency currency during crises
(Aldrich-Vreeland Act 1908).
Emergency currency, in essence national bank notes backed by securities other than
Treasury notes, contained an escalating interest rate structure, starting at 3% for the first
three months and then rising monthly by 50 basis points (bps) until reaching a ceiling at 6%
(August 4 Amendment 1914). This allowed emergency currency to initially function at
attractive rates, while incentivizing early redemption as conditions normalized.
According to the Aldrich-Vreeland Act, collateral that was eligible to secure the emergency
currency consisted of “any securities, including commercial paper, held by a national
[currency] association” (Aldrich-Vreeland Act 1908, vol. 35, sec. 1). This broad classification
included state and local bonds, miscellaneous securities, commercial paper, and warehouse
receipts. The state and local bonds received a guideline haircut of about 15%, while the
remaining collateral categories had a uniform 25% haircut. However, borrowing banks
overcollateralized emergency currency issuance beyond the guideline haircut, possibly at
the instruction of the Treasury Department (OCC 1915).
Although useful as a crisis tool, emergency currency did not serve as a perfect substitute for
cash. The Aldrich-Vreeland Act stated that emergency currency had “lawful money” status,
as opposed to legal tender (Aldrich-Vreeland Act 1908, vol. 35, sec. 12). Although lawful
money could be used to satisfy depositor withdrawals, it could not be considered reserves
by banks overseen by the US Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). On the other
hand, legal tender can be used for both, making it a more valuable form of money. Therefore,
banks could maintain their reserves by satisfying withdrawals with the emergency currency
rather than gold and silver certificates, which were legal tender (Silber 2008, 86).
Congress passed a law on August 4, 1914, that amended the emergency currency
authorization to grant the Treasury secretary the authority to suspend the limit on issuance
and expanded the eligible participants to include previously ineligible national banks, as well
as state banks and trust companies if they agreed to join the Federal Reserve System (August
4 Amendment 1914). However, few state banks and trust companies signed up due to the
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stringent costs associated with their membership in the Federal Reserve System (Jacobson
and Tallman 2015).
In total, 1,363 borrowing banks in 41 national currency associations issued $386 million in
emergency currency, with a peak outstanding of about $364 million on October 24, 1914.
This total reached only one-quarter of the maximum emergency currency potentially
available to banks. The banks retired the entire sum of emergency currency by July 1, 1915,
except for a nominal sum later recovered. None of the emergency currency issuance incurred
a loss (OCC 1915). See Figure 1 for a visualization of peak outstanding emergency currency
issuance and the retirement path.
Figure 1: Total Outstanding Emergency Currency versus Retirement

Source: Author’s creation.

Summary Evaluation
The comptroller of the currency stated in the OCC’s annual report that the issuance of
emergency currency:
[E]nabled [banks] to maintain currency payments throughout the entire country, a
record they were unable to make in 1893 and in 1907, and in previous crises infinitely
less far-reaching than [the Crisis of 1914]. (OCC 1915)
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In agreement, O.M.W. Sprague (1915), a prominent contemporaneous scholar on financial
crises, states, “In no former crisis was the aid rendered by the government so immediate and
effective,” as banks expanded lending which did not typically happen during previous crises.
On the other hand, Silber (2008, 88) notes that the rapid influx of emergency currency did
not result in an immediate decrease in interest rates, which indicated that the currency
simply replaced withdrawals rather than generating excess liquidity. Additionally, Silber
refers to the previously mentioned comptroller of the currency quote as a “self-serving
evaluation,” as the comptroller was involved in implementing the emergency currency
issuance (Silber 2008, 88).
According to Jacobson and Tallman (2015), the “emergency currency was crucial in
preventing a panic in 1914.” They also note that clearinghouse loan certificates (CLCs) issued
by organizations such as the New York Clearing House played a “secondary, but still
consequential, role in forestalling financial panic” in 1914, since emergency currency was
accessible only to national banks (Jacobson and Tallman 2015).
While the issuance of emergency currency seemingly prevented widespread domestic
suspensions of convertibility, it did not help with foreign exchange markets. Emergency
currency could not be used as an international note of exchange, a role served only by gold
at the time. Emergency currency was limited to preventing domestic bank runs and
projecting stability, while failing to halt gold outflows to foreign nations (Silber 2008, 89).
In his memoir, Treasury Secretary McAdoo states his opinion on the need for and success of
emergency currency:
I brought this clumsy act out of the legislative garret and succeeded in getting Congress
to amend it radically so that it would work . . . while it was in use it served fairly well, in
spite of its obvious disadvantages, for the crisis was acute in August, 1914, and anything
that promised relief, on any terms, was welcome. (McAdoo 1931, 215)
The nascent Federal Reserve also helped alleviate pressure on banks, albeit not until after
the acute phase of the crisis occurred in August 1914. A provision in the Federal Reserve Act
that took effect on November 16, on the establishment of the reserve banks, lowered
member banks’ reserve requirements. The change in reserve requirements released “a very
considerable amount of funds which had previously had to be held idle by the banks in order
to bring or keep themselves within the requirements of the law,” according to the Fed’s first
annual report (Fed 1915a).
Early senior members of the Federal Reserve did not share positive opinions about the effect
of emergency currency (Tallman and Jacobson 2019). The first chairman of the Federal
Reserve, Charles Hamlin, stated in a 1916 speech that “emergency currency, while offering a
supply of currency, yet this currency in itself did not reestablish confidence” because of the
illiquid collateral pledged and the small 5% redemption fund (Hamlin 1916). According to
Hamlin, the intervention worked because it demonstrated a “sound banking system had been
established,” through the eventual opening of the Federal Reserve System (Hamlin 1916).
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W.P.G. Harding, an early member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, directly credits
the Federal Reserve’s creation for halting a further panic, stating:
Relief was afforded by the issue of . . . emergency [currency], and following the
establishment of the Federal Reserve banks on November 16, 1914 there was a rapid
return to more normal conditions. (Harding 1918, emphasis added)
In its first annual report through December 31, 1914, the Federal Reserve suggested that it
could have done more if it had been fully operational: “Had the Federal Reserve Banks been
in operation at the beginning of August they would naturally have supplied the great volume
of currency which was called for” (Fed 1915a).
As a counterpoint, Tallman and Jacobson (2019) express skepticism about how much the
Federal Reserve could have done in its early years, as its operations were consumed by the
administrative and bureaucratic challenges of launching a large organization. They say it is
unlikely that the Federal Reserve could have addressed the crisis on its own, as it only began
to “gain traction in 1917” (Tallman and Jacobson 2019). As evidence, they show that Federal
Reserve notes made up less than 10% of the currency base in the United States until 1917;
the Federal Reserve might not have been able to achieve the same result as emergency
currency during the Crisis of 1914.
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Context: United States 1914–1915
$11.5 billion in 1914
Total assets of national banks
$13.2 billion in 1915
$1.6 billion in 1914
Reserves held by national banks
$2.1 billion in 1915
$6.3 billion in 1914
Loans and discounts by national banks
$7.2 billion in 1915
Number of national currency associations
45 in 1914
Number of banks represented by a national
2,197 in 1914
currency association
Percent of total banks represented by national
29.15% in 1914
currency associations
Number of banks that applied for emergency
currency through a national currency
1,366 in 1914
association
Source: OCC 1915.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: When confidence in the banking system eroded as the First World War
erupted, the Treasury Department allowed banks to issue emergency currency to
preserve their reserves and calm money markets since the Federal Reserve
System was not yet operational.
As geopolitical tensions rose in Europe during the buildup to the First World War in the
summer of 1914, European stock market exchanges closed and the United States
experienced significant gold outflows (Jacobson and Tallman 2015; Sablik 2013). Foreign
investors began dumping their securities on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) as a
means to easily and quickly liquidate their holdings (Silber 2007). On August 1, the member
banks of the New York Clearing House reported that reserves had fallen by almost $44
million in the previous week, with a deficiency of $17 million (OCC 1914). As a response,
Treasury Secretary McAdoo, at the direction of President Woodrow Wilson, spoke directly
with the NYSE and requested that it close for an undefined period, which it did. It reopened
four months later, on December 12, 1914 (Silber 2007; WSJ 1914).
In previous crises, the banking system largely relied on the emergency liquidity efforts of
clearinghouse associations, which served as private lenders of last resort (LOLRs). After the
Panic of 1907, Congress formed the National Monetary Commission, which recommended
the creation of the Federal Reserve. The Fed would enshrine the LOLR activities of the
private clearinghouse associations in a quasi-governmental institution. However, the Fed
was not functional at the outbreak of the Crisis of 1914, as Senate nominations dragged on
and administrative plans faced delays (Silber 2008, 73).
On July 31, Secretary McAdoo announced that he planned to exercise the Treasury’s powers
under the Aldrich-Vreeland Act to allow banks to issue emergency currency, backed by a
much wider range of collateral than usually allowed for note issuance.
McAdoo had previously indicated in 1913 a willingness to utilize emergency currency by
announcing that $500 million in emergency currency would be available in response to a
possible banking panic. The announcement of this power calmed the markets, and
emergency currency was never needed or issued at that time (Silber 2007). This event
marked a public willingness from the Treasury Department to use its ability to issue
emergency currency to arrest a banking panic, which it did in 1914.
2. Legal Authority: The Aldrich-Vreeland Act authorized the issuance of emergency
currency, while the Federal Reserve Act, as amended on August 4, 1914, revised
some key aspects of the Aldrich-Vreeland Act for the impending crisis.
In 1908, Congress passed the Aldrich-Vreeland Act, which granted the Treasury Department
the power to issue up to $500 million in “additional circulating notes,” or “emergency
currency,” backed by collateral other than US bonds (Aldrich-Vreeland Act 1908, vol. 35, sec.
5). National bank notes at the time were backed by US bonds. The Federal Reserve Act,
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passed on December 23, 1913, reauthorized the Aldrich-Vreeland Act until June 30, 1915;
the former act was set to expire on June 30, 1914, under the initial legislation (AldrichVreeland Act 1908, vol. 35, sec. 20; Federal Reserve Act 1913, sec. 27). The Federal Reserve
Act also revised the Aldrich-Vreeland Act, lowering the interest rate charged on emergency
currency (Aldrich-Vreeland Act 1908, vol. 35, sec. 9; Federal Reserve Act 1913, sec. 27). This
would prove to be a key decision that helped prevent the Crisis of 1914 from spiraling into a
full panic. It appears that the Aldrich-Vreeland Act, and the powers contained within, was
not extended beyond June 1915.
As the crisis unfolded, Secretary McAdoo requested on July 31, 1914, that Congress amend
the Federal Reserve Act to address two main issues: the eligibility of large banks to
participate and the $500 million limit on total issuance of emergency currency. The Senate
debated the amendment for only 10 minutes before passing it (Silber 2008, 77). On August
4, 1914, the amendment officially became law (Silber 2008, 79).3 This amendment is
discussed later in the case study as the “August 4 Amendment.”
Media coverage during the early days of issuance of the emergency currency noted that some
questions regarding its legality were raised, as this was the first (and would be the only)
usage of the Treasury’s authority to issue emergency currency. The New York Times
referenced many meetings between government officials to settle certain debates (NYT
1914b).4
3. Part of a Package: Clearinghouses issued a total of $212 million in clearinghouse
loan certificates as a complement to emergency currency.
Many banking institutions were not able to issue emergency currency because they did not
meet the eligibility standards. As in previous crises, local clearinghouses acted as private
lenders of last resort, with the NYCH taking a leading role (Fulmer 2022). The NYCH issued
clearinghouse loan certificates to member banks, which used the CLCs as temporary
substitutes for legal tender when settling clearing balances. This allowed member banks to
avoid contracting lending and liquidating their assets in order to make payment. The
Aldrich-Vreeland Act modeled emergency currency’s structure and function on CLCs, albeit
with several significant changes discussed later in this case study (Jacobson and Tallman
2015).
CLCs could not be used outside the NYCH or for any other purposes. However, other
clearinghouses (particularly those in the South) allowed CLCs to circulate outside their
memberships (Andrew 1908). At its peak, 12 clearinghouses across the United States issued
almost $200 million in CLCs to member banks, with the NYCH accounting for $109 million of
that total (Fulmer 2022). Denomination was a significant difference between CLCs and
Representative Victor Murdock, one of only six representatives to vote against the amendment, stated,
“Ordinarily [this amendment] would not pass Congress without days of debate, if it could pass at all” (Silber
2008, 78).
4 For example, the deposit location of the collateral backing emergency currency and the exact application form
proved contentious (the government decided to keep them with the national currency associations instead of
the Subtreasury) (NYT 1914b).
3
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emergency currency in New York. The NYCH issued CLCs only in denominations larger than
$5,000, while emergency currency largely came in denominations less than $100. This
illuminates the different use of the emergency measures in New York, as CLCs circulated in
interbank transactions at larger denominations while emergency currency could be used to
handle depositor withdrawals at lower denominations (Jacobson and Tallman 2015).
A study by Jacobson and Tallman (2015) focusing on New York concludes that emergency
currency and CLCs were not substitutes for New York banks but rather complements that
together constituted a replacement for legal tender. Emergency currency issuance grew the
money supply available to banks, while CLCs granted banks greater flexibility in handling
payment for settling clearing balances and could be issued to the state banks and trust
companies that were barred from utilizing emergency currency (discussed in Key Design
Decision No. 6, Eligible Participants). Many New York banks took out both forms of liquidity,
implying that there were unique benefits to both (Jacobson and Tallman 2015).
Outside of New York, Sprague (1915) notes, emergency currency was preferred to CLCs, as
banks could use emergency currency across regions, outside set clearinghouse associations.
Additionally, the law as revised on August 4 set the interest rate on emergency currency
much lower initially than the rate on CLCs (3% versus 6%), leading borrowing banks to
prefer emergency currency while creditor banks preferred CLCs. There was a significant
decline in CLC usage in 1914 compared to the crisis of 1907. The number of clearinghouse
associations that issued CLCs dropped from 51 in 1907 to 12 in 1914, while the peak
outstanding amount of CLCs went from $227 million to $196 million (OCC 1915).
4. Management: The Treasury Department and national currency associations
worked together to manage the emergency currency program.
Both the Treasury Department and national currency associations operated as managers of
the emergency currency program. The Treasury Department had to approve the formation
of national currency associations, which consisted of a board filled with one representative
of each member bank. Additionally, each association had a president, vice president,
treasurer, secretary, and five-person executive committee. The Treasury Department
required associations to file bylaws for its approval. Furthermore, the Treasury secretary
had the authority to make “any such rules and regulations and exercise such control over the
organization and management of national currency associations” (Aldrich-Vreeland Act
1908).
At the end of 1913, there were 21 national currency associations in operation, representing
352 national banks (OCC 1914). This would increase to 45 associations, representing 2,197
banks, by the end of 1914 (OCC 1915). It does not appear that national currency associations
had any significant role to play after the opening of the Federal Reserve System. In 1913–
1915, the annual reports of the OCC contain entire sections on national currency
associations, while the 1916 annual report does not mention them once. The AldrichVreeland Act expired in 1915, and there does not appear to be any indication that national
currency associations continued to exist beyond that expiration.
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5. Administration: The Treasury Department approved applications for emergency
currency issuance, which could be used for depositor withdrawals and other
payments but not as reserves.
If a bank wished to issue emergency currency during the crisis, it submitted an application
to its national currency association along with the pledged collateral, which was held in trust
by the association. If the association approved this application, the application as well as a
schedule of pledged collateral, were forwarded to the comptroller of the currency and the
secretary of the Treasury. Once the secretary of the Treasury approved the issuance of
emergency currency, the bank notes were shipped to the borrowing bank (OCC 1914).
In the opening days of emergency currency issuance, newspapers reported concerns from
bankers about the administration and efficiency of the program. In the New York Times on
August 3, one banker remarked that the Treasury lagged in its printing, claiming that less
than half of the more than $100 million available to New York City banks had been printed
and brought to the city (NYT 1914a). The Aldrich-Vreeland Act directed the Treasury
Secretary to print the emergency currency after its passage in 1908, which it did and stored
in a DC vault (Silber 2008, 80). When Secretary McAdoo authorized the issuance on August
3, the Treasury immediately shipped $46 million of notes to New York City, which was the
amount eligible for the initial set of New York City banks (NYT 1914a). However, extra lastminute printing and shipping was required for the remaining $100 million. Therefore, while
the banker is correct that the Treasury needed to print and ship more currency, it was not a
predictable change that could have been anticipated.
The NYCH swiftly began issuance of CLCs on August 3 after the emergency currency
authorization, likely due to its institutional experience in crisis fighting. The New York Times
explicitly made the comparison between the NYCH’s prompt action and the Treasury
Department’s slower rollout of relief (NYT 1914b).
6. Eligible Participants: Members of national currency associations could issue
emergency currency, as well as state banks and trust companies if they joined the
Federal Reserve System.
According to the Aldrich-Vreeland Act, a group of at least 10 national banks could form a
national currency association, which would serve as the only association in its city.
Membership to these associations, and consequently access to emergency currency, was
limited to only national banks at the time of passage of the act in 1908. This excluded state
banks and trust companies from participating in the issuance of emergency currency. The
Federal Reserve Act required every national bank to join the Federal Reserve System upon
its creation (Federal Reserve Act 1913).
The Aldrich-Vreeland Act and the Federal Reserve Act established that a national bank could
borrow emergency currency only if it had outstanding national bank notes equal to at least
40% of its capital stock (Aldrich-Vreeland Act 1908, vol. 35, sec. 3; Federal Reserve Act 1913,
sec. 27). This requirement restricted many national banks from borrowing emergency
currency as they had not issued enough national bank notes (Sablik 2013). However, as war
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in Europe erupted, Congress amended the Federal Reserve Act on August 4 to allow the
Treasury secretary to suspend the 40% condition at the secretary’s discretion (August 4
Amendment 1914).5
Additionally, in the August 4 Amendment, Congress gave the Treasury secretary the
authority to grant access to state banks and trust companies, on the condition that they join
the Federal Reserve System by August 19 (August 4 Amendment 1914). Despite the set of
eligible participants technically widening, state banks and trust companies largely declined
to join the Federal Reserve System because membership imposed high administrative and
cost burdens (Jacobson and Tallman 2015; Sablik 2013). By May 1915, only 17 trust
companies and state banks had joined the Federal Reserve System, compared to 7,605
national banks in the system (Fed 1915b). Therefore, the vast majority of these institutions
were not eligible for emergency currency and had to rely on clearinghouse loan certificates
if eligible in their cities.
In total, 1,366 banks in 41 national currency associations issued emergency currency. There
were 45 national currency associations at the time, with 2,197 members in total (OCC 1915).
Therefore, about 62% of eligible national banks issued emergency currency.
Alternatively, individual national banks could apply directly to the Treasury Department for
emergency currency, without the need to join a national currency association. A bank
applying for emergency currency in this manner could utilize only state, county, and
municipal bonds as collateral, subject to a 10% discount (Aldrich-Vreeland Act 1908, vol. 35,
sec. 3). In total, only eight national banks took this option, for a small total of $910,500 (OCC
1915). However, more than $70 million of state, county, and municipal bonds were pledged
as collateral for emergency currency (OCC 1915). Therefore, national banks pledged the vast
majority of this type of collateral through national currency associations, despite the ability
to directly request emergency currency from the Treasury Department. This implies that
national banks likely preferred the risk-pooling dynamic of the national currency
associations and the ability to pledge commercial assets as collateral for emergency
currency. Additionally, it cannot be ruled out that dealing directly with the Treasury
Department was administratively and bureaucratically slow, since this was the first issuance
of emergency currency.
7. Funding Source: National currency association memberships were jointly liable
for the issuance of emergency currency.
According to the Aldrich-Vreeland Act, the national currency association member banks
were jointly liable for the emergency currency issuance. If member banks failed and were
unable to pay off their emergency currency, the federal government had a lien on the assets
of “all banks belonging to the association” (Aldrich-Vreeland Act 1908, vol. 35, sec. 1). This
resembled the structure of CLCs, which were jointly guaranteed by the clearinghouse
membership.
Congressional deliberations revealed that some in Congress viewed this amendment as unfairly supporting
and prioritizing the needs of New York City banks (Silber 2008, 78).
5
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Under the Aldrich-Vreeland Act, if any currency association had outstanding emergency
currency, it had to pay into a redemption fund 5% of the outstanding amount. 6 If banks did
not pay into or failed to maintain the redemption fund, the Treasury could remove money
from the redemption funds of other banks in the same currency association to account for
this issue (Aldrich-Vreeland Act 1908).
8. Program Size: Participating institutions faced a legislative limit on emergency
currency issuance, although the August 4 Amendment allowed the Treasury
secretary to suspend this limit.
The Aldrich-Vreeland Act set a hard cap on outstanding emergency currency issuance at
$500 million (Aldrich-Vreeland Act 1908, vol. 35, sec. 5). However, the August 4 Amendment
allowed the Treasury secretary to discretionarily suspend this ceiling (August 4 Amendment
1914, 13:683). Although the amendment did not establish a new limit and the Treasury
secretary did not announce a new limit, news reports estimated that eligible banks could
issue more than $1 billion in emergency currency, based on the collateral available to them
(NYT 1914b). After the Crisis of 1914, the comptroller of the currency estimated that the
theoretical limit on emergency currency issuance in 1914 was almost $1.5 billion (OCC
1915).
In total, participants issued $386 million in emergency currency, with a peak outstanding of
about $364 million on October 24, 1914. Therefore, banks issued less than one-quarter of
the theoretical limit on emergency currency. Emergency currency functioned as a temporary
relief measure before the Federal Reserve System was operational. Eighty percent of the
issuance during the Crisis of 1914 occurred in cities that hosted Federal Reserve banks.
Figure 2 shows the state-level data on emergency currency issuance as a share of the
theoretical limit. This can serve as a proxy for financial stress, as states with a larger
utilization of their limits (which is a function of banking sector size) indicate a greater need
for additional liquidity. Issuance appears most concentrated in New York and the Southern
states. Banks in nine states did not issue any emergency currency (OCC 1915).

Unrelated to the issuance of emergency currency, banks at the time already maintained a redemption fund at
the Treasury equal to 5% of circulation of national bank notes backed by US bonds (Laughlin 1908).
6
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Figure 2: State-Level Emergency Currency Issuance, Based on the Size of the Banking
Sector (as a % of Theoretical Limit)

Source: Author’s creation; OCC 1915.

9. Individual Participation Limits: Borrowing banks could issue up to 125% of their
capital.
The August 4 Amendment limited individual participating institution issuance to 125% of
their capital and surplus (August 4 Amendment 1914). Additionally, the Aldrich-Vreeland
Act restricted issuance of emergency currency within each state to its proportion of the
nation’s total capital and surplus. However, the Treasury secretary could reallocate the
emergency currency issuance cap of states that had not used their full issuance amount to
states within the same region that wished to exceed their limits (Aldrich-Vreeland Act 1908,
vol. 35, sec. 7). Research could not confirm whether individual currency associations had
internal participation limits.
10. Rate Charged: Emergency currency had an escalating interest rate structure that
was set at 3% for the first three months and rose after nine months to 6%, which
was the rate on clearinghouse loan certificates.
According to the Federal Reserve Act, emergency currency carried an interest rate (“tax”) of
3% for the first three months, based on the average amount of emergency currency in
circulation held by the institution. After that point, the interest rate increased 50 bps until a
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ceiling of 6% was reached, in the ninth month (August 4 Amendment 1914). The AldrichVreeland Act initially established an interest rate of 5% for the first month, which then
increased by 1% every month until a ceiling of 10% was reached (Aldrich-Vreeland Act 1908,
vol. 35, sec. 9). The comptroller of the currency referred to this initial rate as “onerous” (OCC
1914). He then claimed the lower rate charged in the Federal Reserve Act was “practicable
and efficient” (OCC 1914).
The interest charged on emergency currency went to the Division of Redemption of the
Treasury (Aldrich-Vreeland Act 1908, vol. 35, sec. 9). This amounted to almost $3 million for
the entirety of the program (OCC 1915).
The interest rate did not vary by jurisdiction. At least initially, emergency currency had a
much lower interest rate than clearinghouse loan certificates at the New York Clearing House
Association, which had a uniform 6% rate (Fulmer 2022). Figure 3 presents money market
rates in New York City during 1914, as there is no nationwide interest rate data to compare
emergency currency against. In New York City alone, it appears that emergency currency had
a below-market price, at least before the escalating structure kicked in. However, this rising
rate stopped at 6%, which could still be considered a market rate, per Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Money Market Rates in New York City during the Crisis of 1914

Note: Shaded area represents the period in which the New York Clearing House Association issued CLCs
generally reflecting the crisis period. The dashed horizontal line shows the 3% initial rate charged on
emergency currency, although this rate began increasing after three months to a maximum of 6%. The dotted
horizontal line shows the 6% rate charged on CLCs. Data was provided monthly as a range.
Source: Author’s creation; OCC 1914; OCC 1915.

11. Eligible Collateral: Any security held by a national banking association could be
used as collateral for issuing emergency currency.
According to the Aldrich-Vreeland Act, eligible collateral for emergency currency included
“any securities, including commercial paper, held by a national banking association”
(Aldrich-Vreeland Act 1908, vol. 35, sec. 1). Seemingly any securities held by national
banking associations were eligible as collateral.7
For state and municipal bonds, the state or locality had to exist for at least 10 years and not
have defaulted in the same period (Aldrich-Vreeland Act 1908, vol. 35, sec. 4). There was no
limitation on the issuance size of state and municipal bonds as a proportion of the state’s or
municipality’s capital and surplus.
Laughlin (1908) claims that the Aldrich-Vreeland granted “sweeping” powers, by simply referring to “any
securities.” Laughlin states that some members of Congress assumed that they were limiting the securities to
“legitimate commercial paper,” but the wording clearly indicated that “any securities” were allowed (Laughlin
1908).
7
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As for commercial paper, the act defined it as “notes representing actual commercial
transactions . . . [that] bear the names of at least two responsible parties and have not
exceeding four months to run” (Aldrich-Vreeland Act 1908, vol. 35, sec. 1). Consistent with
banking in the early 20th century, the act did not indicate what qualified a party as
responsible. Borrowing banks could not use commercial paper to issue emergency currency
in excess of 30% of their capital and surplus (OCC 1914).
In the 1915 annual report by the OCC, the Treasury divided pledged collateral for emergency
currency into four categories:
•

State, municipal, and county bonds;

•

Miscellaneous securities, including industrial bonds, and other securities, mainly city
and town notes and warrants;

•

Commercial paper; and

•

Notes secured by warehouse receipts for cotton, tobacco, and naval stores (OCC
1915).8

The national currency associations had the authority to request either additional collateral
or a collateral substitute if the securities deposited failed to meet its standards. Ten days
after a borrowing bank failed, the association could sell the deposited collateral on the
market and return the proceeds to the Treasury. If this sale was not enough to cover the
emergency currency, the association had a lien on the assets of the failed bank (AldrichVreeland Act 1908, vol. 35, sec. 1).
The Aldrich-Vreeland Act established that the state and municipal bonds received at least a
15% haircut, while commercial paper and all other securities received at least a 25% haircut
(Aldrich-Vreeland Act 1908, vol. 35, sec. 1). However, as can be seen in Figure 4, stricter
haircuts were applied to every type of collateral pledged.

8 This category appears

to have been a concession to Southern states, especially the inclusion of cotton receipts

(Silber 2008, 87).
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Figure 4: Pledged Collateral Breakdown
Type of collateral

Amount pledged

Emergency
currency issued

Percent of total
issuance

Guideline haircut

Actual
haircut

Commercial paper

$

359,535,317 $

220,466,678

57%

25% of face value

39%

Miscellaneous securities

$

152,093,340 $

109,386,633

28% 25% of market value

28%

State and municipal bonds

$

70,010,846 $

54,230,119

14% 15% of market value

23%

Warehouse receipts

$

4,224,888 $

2,360,785

25% of face value

44%

Total

$

585,864,392 $

386,444,215

1%

Source: OCC 1915.

12. Loan Duration: Emergency currency did not have a set maturity.
Emergency currency functioned similarly to notes secured on US bonds in that they could be
retired at any time without a set maturity (OCC 1914).
13. Other Conditions: Research did not determine any additional conditions on
emergency currency.
Research did not determine other conditions attached to emergency currency.
14. Impact on Monetary Policy Transmission: Emergency currency had a significant,
but short-term, effect on the money supply due to the widespread issuance.
Due to the period of history that this case focuses on, this Key Design Decision assesses the
effect of emergency currency on the money supply, rather than monetary policy, as the gold
standard was in effect. The issuance of emergency currency had a significant effect on the
money supply. According to Silber (2008, 86, citing Friedman and Schwartz 1963), the
money supply grew by an annual rate of almost 10% in the first three months of the crisis.
At the time, news reports stoked fears of excessive issuance of currency. Silber details an
opinion piece from the New York Times that starts by supporting the emergency currency
issuance but ends with a strong warning of potential negative consequences of excessive
issuance. Additionally, he documents a Wall Street Journal article that attacks the relatively
low interest rate charged on emergency currency, referring to the “craze for easy money”
(Silber 2008, 87).
However, these concerns about excessive currency issuance proved unnecessary, as banks
quickly retired their emergency currency and money supply growth from August-December
actually declined when compared to previous years (Silber 2008, 87).
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15. Other Options: Research did not uncover additional options considered prior to
the issuance of emergency currency.
Research did not determine other options considered by the government to respond to the
Crisis of 1914, as the Federal Reserve was not operational at the time. Dodge (1922) says
that many businesspeople believed that the emergency currency issued were actually
Federal Reserve notes, due to the timing of the issuance of the currency amid significant
promotion of the new central bank, which began to issue notes only in November.
16. Similar Programs in Other Countries: Research did not determine any
international coordination in the emergency currency program.
The emergency currency program did not involve any international coordination.
17. Communication: The Treasury secretary announced details of the program in the
newspapers.
In one of the first media mentions of the possibility of emergency currency issuance,
Secretary McAdoo told the Wall Street Journal on August 1, 1914:
The Aldrich-Vreeland Act, as amended by the Federal Reserve Act, is still in force, and
the terms upon which currency may be issued under that act are now so favorable that
resort may be made quickly and effectively to it to meet any emergency . . . there is in the
Treasury, printed and ready for issue, USD 500,000,000 of currency. (WSJ 1914)
This indicated a proactive willingness to use the Aldrich-Vreeland Act to position the
Treasury Department as a lender of last resort rather than a midcrisis decision. Secretary
McAdoo officially announced the authorization of emergency currency on August 3 in the
newspapers (Silber 2008, 79; NYT 1914a). Newspapers reported on further updates to the
emergency currency operation. Additionally, the annual report of the OCC provided detailed
information and data on the emergency currency issuance (OCC 1914; OCC 1915).
18. Disclosure: The Treasury Department did not release individual issuance
amounts during the Crisis of 1914.
Section 9 of the Aldrich-Vreeland Act required national currency associations to provide
monthly reports to the Treasury Department of outstanding emergency currency in order to
calculate the interest charges accumulated (Aldrich-Vreeland Act 1908).
Research could not determine any individual bank-level disclosure of usage during the Crisis
of 1914 by the Treasury Department. The annual reports of the OCC seem to have provided
the sole source of data on emergency currency issuance, albeit at a highly aggregated level.
However, some disclosure of individual emergency currency issuance appeared in a
contemporary newspaper article. The New York Tribune published on August 6 the names of
four banks that requested emergency currency and the amount granted to them. It is unclear
from the language used in the article (“it was learned”) if this was found through
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investigative reporting or as a public announcement from the banks or Treasury Department
(New York Tribune 1914). Research could not determine if this was a single instance of
disclosure or a common practice.
19. Stigma Strategy: The Aldrich-Vreeland Act designed emergency currency to look
like national bank notes, likely to prevent depositors from discriminating against
accepting emergency currency.
The Aldrich-Vreeland Act made individual emergency currency notes appear almost
identical to national bank notes (Aldrich-Vreeland Act 1908, vol. 35, sec. 11). Banners along
the top of national bank notes said, “Secured by United States Bonds Deposited with the
Treasurer of the United States”; similar banners along the top of emergency notes said,
“Secured by United States Bonds or Other Securities” (Jacobson and Tallman 2015). This
would imply that the law intended to block disclosure of individual usage of emergency
currency, since holders did not have information on whether the notes were secured by US
bonds or other securities (Silber 2008, 76). As a result, depositors asking for withdrawals
from their banks likely could not have easily determined if their banks issued emergency
currency.
20. Exit Strategy: The escalating interest rate structure on emergency currency
encouraged holders to retire it as soon as the crisis subsided.
The escalating interest rate structure on emergency currency encouraged borrowers to
retire notes quickly. Additionally, it seems that Congress did not extend the Aldrich-Vreeland
Act beyond mid-1915, which removed the ability to issue emergency currency.
Although the Federal Reserve became operational in November 2014, Federal Reserve notes
did not immediately replace emergency currency. Banks continued to request emergency
currency despite the availability of the Federal Reserve notes, indicating that they were not
perfect substitutes. Therefore, according to Dodge (1922), emergency currency was simply
a necessity during a panic, while institutions used Federal Reserve notes for more regular
business activities. However, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland indicated in 1915 that
the quick retirement of emergency currency required the reserve bank to issue Federal
Reserve notes in response (Fed 1916).
The comptroller of the currency announced that borrowing banks had retired all of the
emergency currency issued by July 1, 1915, except for a small sum issued to a failed bank.
This nominal amount ($200,000) was recovered by December 1915. As a result, the
emergency currency program did not face any losses (OCC 1915). See Figure 1 for a depiction
of outstanding emergency currency along with its subsequent aggregate retirement.
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